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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD B. CAHOON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs-
ROBERT P. PELTON, 
Defendant and Appellarnt. 
Case 
No. 8976 
BRIEF 0'F RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Howard B. Cahoon, married his wife, 
Dorothy Cahoon, in Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 28, 
1947. (Exhibit P-2). He met his wife approximately a 
year before the marriage while she was working as a 
waitress at the Hotel Utah. (R. 185, 188, 446, 480). Mrs. 
Cahoon had two daughters by a previous marriage. Plain-
tiff adopted the two girls in about 1953. (R. 157, 456). 
Plaintiff, his wife and the two girls lived in Salt 
Lake until about 1950. During this time plaintiff and his 
wife worked together in the Jiffy Dog business. She 
would get up early in the morning, make and package 
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sandwiches, and then he would take the family car and 
deliver them to the various places in Salt Lake. ~Irs. 
Cahoon worked on an average of five or six hours per 
day. (R. 163, 164, 460). This was plaintiff's first marri-
age. (R. 156). Plaintiff and his wife loved each other very 
much. While living in Salt Lake City they visited their 
relatives, attended screenings together, took trips to-
gether and enjoyed each others company. ~Irs. Cahoon 
was an excellent mother and wife. (R. 164, 165, 459 and 
460). After moving to Las Vegas in about 1950, the rela-
tionship between plaintiff and his -wife continued good. 
They attended conventions together, \\orked together in 
the drive-in theaters, took trips together, went picnicking, 
horseback riding and swimming with the children. (R. 
166-171, 466-471). Because of the nature of their business 
plaintiff and his wife were together a great deal. 
Plaintiff and his wife had two children, "Andra" and 
"Brit". Dr. A. A. Anderson of Salt Lake Cit:, "Ctah, took 
care of nirs. Cahoon at the time of the delivery of Andra. 
The doctor in August of 1949, took a blood sample from 
jfr. and :Mrs. Cahoon and found that they had blood 
types that might cause trouble -with future pregnancies. 
The doctor called both :Jir. and :Jirs. Cahoon into his 
office and advised them of the danger of having a second 
child and also of having a third child because of their 
blood types. (R. 292-299, 68-!-690). :Jirs. Cahoon at times 
would eomplain to plaintiff that they were not having 
sexual relations as often as perhaps they should. (R.192). 
On one occasion soon after ~Irs. Cahoon became pregnant 
with Brit the matter of not enough sexual intercourse 
came up during the eonversation. Plaintiff in a burst of 
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anger stated to his wife that if they didn't have enough 
sexual intercourse then the baby must not be his. He was 
immediately sorry. He knew there was no foundation 
for what he said and he apologized. (R. 201, 202, 616, 617 
and 621-3). We call the court's attention to the article 
in Exhibit P-3 regarding plaintiff's son, Brit, and plain-
tiff's testimony on pages 201, 202, 204, 205 and 501 and 
502 of the record concerning the paternity of his son. 
Plaintiff completely answers any claim that he ever 
denied paternity of his son. 
Plaintiff and his wife were introduced to Mr. Pelton 
in November of 1954. Mrs. Cahoon came to Salt Lake 
in June or July of 1955 and stayed for a period of three 
or four weeks. Plaintiff and his wife came to Salt Lake 
during the Christmas holidays of 1955 and stayed one 
week. Mrs. Cahoon was in Salt Lake again for a period 
of four or five weeks in June or July of 1956. (R. 363, 
472). The next time defendant saw Mrs. Cahoon after 
their introduction was in Salt Lake City in the summer 
of 1955. (R. 333, 584). That fall defendant saw Mrs. 
Cahoon in Las Vegas. (R. 334, 585). Defendant wrote two 
or three letters per month to Mrs. Cahoon and called her 
five or six times from Salt Lake City between June, 1955 
and June, 1956. (R. 334, 335, 337, 588). Mr. Pelton went 
through Las Vegas quite often and tried to call her on 
each occasion. He took her for a ride in his airplane. He 
saw Mrs. Cahoon in her mother's home in Salt Lake in 
December, 1955, when her husband was not present. Mr. 
Pelton took a fishing trip to Lake Mead in January or 
February, 1956, and at that time took Mrs. Cahoon out 
to dinner. He met her while Mrs. Cahoon was riding in 
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a boat with her daughter on Lake Mead. Mrs. Cahoon 
got into Mr. Pelton's boat. (R. 336-340, 587-591). Mrs. 
Cahoon and defendant went horseback riding in Evans-
ton, Wyoming. They were alonewhile driving from Salt 
Lake City to Evanston and returning. Defendant kissed 
~1rs. Cahoon on several occasions both while she was 
here in Salt Lake City in the summer of 1955 and in 1956 
and when he saw her in Las Vegas. (R. 341, 357, 592). 
Defendant told Mrs. Cahoon he was fond of her and she 
said she was fond of him. (R. 345, 596). Mrs. Cahoon told 
}fr. Pelton she loved him and he let her know that he 
returned her feelings. (R. 351, 602). They danced. He sent 
her a Valentine card and a bathing suit for her birthday. 
(R. 344, 360, 595, 611). Roxanne, plaintiff's daughter, 
testified that she saw Mr. Pelton for the first time in the 
Cahoon home in Las Vegas; that he was in the Cahoon 
home on four or five occasions and most of the time 
that was in the evening. He sta~~ed there as long as an 
hour to an hour and one-half. That :Jir. Pelton kissed her 
mother while in the kitchen of the home in the presence 
of some of Roxanne's friends. That defendant borrowed 
a swimn1ing suit from Roxanne's boy friend, and defend-
ant and Mrs. Cahoon left the house about 10:00 o'clock at 
night and did not return until about 10:00 o'clock the 
next day. (R. 271-278, 519-52±). On one occasion Roxanne 
took her mother to the ~~qua ~Iotel in Las Yegas and 
left her there with ~Ir. Pelton for about an hour and 
one-half. When Roxanne returned ~Ir. Pelton and her 
1nother were alone in the n1otel and were having some 
drinks together (R. 276, 277, 524). Defendant kissed her 
while in the 1notel. (R. 353, 60±). Roxanne picked up let-
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ters from defendant on four or five occasions addressed 
to a Ginger Cameron. (R. 277, 526). Roxanne was about 
fifteen years old during this time. 
Plaintiff's daughter, Sylvia, testified she met the de-
fendant once in their home. (R. 262, 511). She also picked 
up letters three or four times at the post office. 
Roxanne finally told her father about Mr. Pelton in 
about September of 1956. Plaintiff and his wife separated 
soon thereafter. 
Sometime in December, 1956, Richard C. Cahoon, 
brother of the plaintiff, had a conversation with the 
defendant during which he asked the defendant if he was 
going to marry Dorothy. When he asked the defendant, 
"Why did you ever go to Howard's home in front of his 
children~", the defendant said, "He didn't. That he would 
call her and she would meet him at his hotel or in town". 
Richard ·Cahoon asked the defendant about the time when 
he borrowed the swimming suit, and why he kissed 
Dorothy in front of the children. The defendant shrugged 
his shoulders and said there was no harm in that. Mr. 
Calwon asked the defendant during this conversation 
why he slept with Dorothy in Howard's home and the 
defendant replied, "I never slept with her in the home, 
when I slept with her it was in a hotel or in Salt Lake 
City when the children weren't around." The defendant 
also stated to Mr. Cahoon, "I'm not the first one to sleep 
with Mrs. Cahoon besides her husband". (R. 302-305, 
540-541). 
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Wayne B. Thiriot, a close friend of plaintiff and his 
wife, in the summer of 1956 was visiting in Salt Lake 
and did see Mrs. Cahoon and the defendant together in 
the Variety Club in Salt Lake. Mr. Thiriot had stopped 
in the Club late at night to get a drink and while there 
he saw Mrs. Cahoon sitting on a couch with a gentleman. 
This gentleman had his arms around her and was kissing 
her for sometime. Mr. Thiriot watched them for several 
minutes before Mrs. Cahoon finally became aware of the 
fact that he was there. Mrs. Cahoon introduced the gentle-
man she was with as Mr. Pelton. (R. 242-247, 558-563). 
Early in 1956 plaintiff first noticed a change in his 
wife's attitude toward him. She became indifferent to 
going out on Saturday night, was upset when plaintiff 
cancelled a fishing trip at the last minute, seemed happy 
when plaintiff left town on his film buying trips and did 
not want to attend a convention and engage in other 
activities that they had done before. (R.169-17-±, 473-475). 
STATE1\fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND HIS WIFE 
WAS VALID. 
POINT II 
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION IS REC-
OGNIZED UNDER NEVADA LAW AND UTAH LAW AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE RECOVERED IN SUCH 
ACTION. (SEE DEFENDANT'S POINTS II AND III) 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS 
TIMELY. 
B. THE EFFECT OF THE ·COURTS ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS TO 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON BOTH CAUSES OF AC-
TION. 
C. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT 
MRS. CAHOON'S AFFECTIONS WERE ALIENATED 
OUTSIDE THE STA'TE OF NEVADA. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO GIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 11. 
(R. 124-125). 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM BRINGING 'THE 
.A:CTIONS IN QUESTION BE.CAUSE OF THE FACT THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE OBTAINED THE DIVORCE. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
FOR FUTURE OR PERMANENT LOSS OF HIS WIFE'S 
SERVICES, AFFECTION, CONSORTIUM AND SOCIETY. 
(SEE DEFENDANT'S POINT VII) 
POINT VII 
I'T WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE NOR TO 
PERMIT COUNSEL TO ARGUE THE SAME 'TO THE JURY. 
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POINT VIII 
IF THE COS'T OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S WIFE 
IS AN OFFSET AT ALL, IT MAY ONLY BE OFFSET A-
GAINST THE $2,500 THAT WAS AWARDED ON THE CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT CORRECTLY PERMITTED PLAINTIFF TO 
READ DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES IN WHICH 'THE 
WITNESSES CLAIMED THEIR P R IV I LEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION. (SEE DEFENDANT'S POINT X 
AND XI) 
POINT X 
THE COURTS REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20 WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
POINT XI 
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 13 WAS NOT PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR. 
POINT XII 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT A 
NEW TRIAL ON GROUND THAT THE VERDICT WAS EX-
CESSIVE. 
.ARG U:JIEXT 
POINT I 
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND HIS WIFE 
WAS VALID. 
Doroth)r Cahoon obtained an interlocutory decree 
of divorre in the State of California on l\farch 19, 1946. 
She 1narried the plaintiff, Howard Cahoon, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on June '27, 1947. On June 23, 1948, the final 
judg1nent of divorce was entered by the California 
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court and was ordered entered nunc pro tunc as of June 
1, 1947. Since the entry of the final decree of divorce 
Dorothy Cahoon and plaintiff, Howard Cahoon, have 
lived together as husband and wife in the States of Utah 
and Nevada. Two children were born as issue of that 
marriage. 
Section 133 of the Civil Code of California is quoted 
at length on page 19 of defendant's brief. We will not 
quote it again. 
The legal effect of the California statute has been de-
termined by the California court in several cases. In 
Macedo vs. Macedo} 29 Cal.App.2nd, 387, 84 P.2d 552, the 
parties were married in February, 1932, and lived to-
gether until 1936 when they separated. The appellant in 
this case then brought an action to annul the marriage 
on the ground that at the time of the marriage, Mary 
:Macedo had a husband who was living. Mary Macedo had 
commenced an action against her husband one Moreira 
and an interlocutory decree of divorce had been entered 
on September 10, 1930. The present action for annulment 
was filed on November 6, 1936. On November 16, 1936, 
Mary JHacedo, the defendant in this case, procured the 
entry of the final decree in the Moreira case nunc pro 
tunc as of September 11, 1931. 
The court held that the entry of the decree nunc pro 
tunc was valid and hence that the marriage between the 
appellant who is the plaintiff in this case was valid with 
the defendant, Mary Macedo. The trial court's action in 
dismissing plaintiff's complaint for annulment was af-
firmed. 
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For other California cases to the same effect see 
Ringel vs. Superior Court of Alemeda County, 128 P.2d 
558, 54 Cal.App.2d 34 (1942); In Re Hughes Estate, 182 
P. 2d 253 80 Cal. App. 2d 550; Hamrick vs. Hamrick, 260 
P. 2d 188, 119 Cal. App. 2d 839. 
The courts of States other than California have had 
occasion to construe the California statute authorizing the 
entry of a final judgment of divorce nunc pro tunc. 
Shippee vs. Shippee, 66 A.2d 77, 95 N.H. 450 (1949) in-
volved an action by the plaintiff husband to annul his 
n1arriage with the defendant. Plaintiff and defendant 
were married in New York on April 5, 1946. On October 
18, 1944, the defendant was granted an interlocutory de-
cree of divorce from her prior husband by a California 
court. On February 25, 1948, a final judgment of divorce 
was entered by the California court. Plaintiff's petition 
for annulment of the marriage was filed April 29, 1948. 
On l\1ay 13, 1948, the California court entered an order 
which directed the clerk to enter the final judgment of 
divorce nunc pro tunc as of October 24, 1945. 
In discussing the legal effect of the nunc pro tunc 
entry of the final judgn1ent of divorce, the New Hamp-
shire court said, "The validity of the marriage ceremony 
performed in New York on April1946, depends upon the 
law of that state." 
The New !Iampshire court went on to say. 
"The judgment of the California court enter-
ed May 13, 1948, that the parties to that action 
were finally divorced as of October 24, 1945, is 
conclusive upon all other courts including those 
10 
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of New York. * * * A judgment previously entered 
nunc pro tunc must be everywhere received and 
enforced in the same manner as though entered 
at the proper time. (See I Freeman Judgments 
Fifth Edition, page 2'63; 49 C.J.S. Sec. 121, page 
256). 
The New Hampshire court then cites Giuliano vs. 
Giul~ano, 163 Misc. 655, 297 N.Y.S. 238, which holds that 
it is not contrary to the public policy of New York to rec-
ognize a decree of divorce entered by a West Virginia 
court nunc pro tunc and that such decree is binding upon 
the courts of New York. A second marriage in the State 
of New York was held valid although a previous divorce 
in West Virginia was made final by a nunc pro tunc de-
cree in the latter State that was not entered until. three 
years after the divorce and one year after the second 
marriage in New York. The New York court in the 
Giuliano case said, 
"It was entered in West Virginia in 1935 nunc 
pro tunc as of August, 1932, which was an adjudi-
cation of that court that the divorce should date 
as of 1932. We may not question the procedure of 
the West Virginia court. Its decree is binding as 
of the date it fixed." 
The New Hampshire court went on to say, 
Since the judgment of the California court de-
claring the divorce of defendant to be effective 
as of October 24, 1945, is conclusive upon all other 
courts, it follows that the marriage of the parties 
on April 5, 1946, should be declared valid. There 
is no public policy in this state contrary to such 
result. The trial courts action in denying the peti-
tion for annulment was affirmed and the trial 
11 
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courts action in granting the defendant a divorce 
was also affirmed." 
Bannister vs. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 29 A.2d 287 
was an action by the plaintiff husband against his wife 
for annuhnent of their mariage. Plaintiff and defendant 
were married on 1Iarch 10, 1935, in the State of Cali-
fornia. The defendant on October 16, 1929, had obtained 
an interlocutory decree of divorce in the State of Cali-
fornia from her previous husband. The final decree of 
divorce was entered in California on ~fay 27, 1935. On 
April 4, 1942, the California court entered another order 
directing that the final decree of divorce be entered nunc 
pro tunc as of October 18, 1930. 
The Maryland Supreme Court held that the nunc pro 
tunc entry by the California court was effective as of the 
date the final judgment was ordered entered by the 
California court so that the marriage of plaintiff and 
defendant was valid. 
In Re Kelley's Estate, 210 Ore. 243, 310 P.2d 328. On 
June 2, 1950, the defendant in this case married John 
L. Kelley in the State of \Vashington. At the time of the 
marriage defendant and l{elley were residents of the 
State of Oregon. On :Jiarch 18, 1949, the defendant's 
previous husband obtained an interlocutory decree of 
divorce fron1 her in the State of \Vashington. The defend-
ant in this case on Septe1nber 8, 1950 obtained a final 
decree of divoree in the \Vashington court. On August 
1 +, 195~. John 1\.:elley died in the State of Oregon. On 
August ~9, 195:2, the defendant in this case obtained an 
mnended final decree of divorce in the \Y ashington court 
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which amended decree ordered that the final decree of 
divorce be entered nunc pro tunc as of September 19, 
1949. 
The defendant in September of 1952, was appointed 
administratrix of her husband's estate. Prior to defend-
ant's marriage with Kelley, he had made a will leaving 
all of his property to his sons and he had neither changed 
that will nor executed a new one after his marriage to the 
defendant. 
The plaintiffs in this action, children of Kelley, filed 
a petition against the defendant for the removal of de-
fendant as adminstratrix on the ground that she was not 
the widow of the decedent. The trial court denied the 
petition for the removal of the defendant as administrat-
rix and entered an order determining that the heirs of 
the decedent, John L. Kelley, were his widow, the 
defendant, Ruth M. Kelley, and his two sons by a prior 
marriage. From this order the plaintiffs appealed. 
The principal question for determination was wheth-
er the entry on August 29, 1952, of a final decree of di-
vorce between defendant and her prior husband by the 
Washington court nunc pro tunc as of September 19, 
1949, pursuant to the Washington statute validated the 
marriage on June 2, 1950, of defendant and the decedent, 
John L. Kelley. If the marriage was valid, it revoked the 
will executed by the decedent prior to such marriage. 
vV ashington in 1949 enacted substantially the same 
statute as had been enacted in California relative to 
entering final decrees of divorce nunc pro tunc. 
13 
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It was argued by the plaintiffs in this case that they 
had acquired vested rights in their father's estate that 
should not be disturbed by permitting the divorce decree 
to be entered nunc pro tunc. The Oregon court said at 
page 336. 
"In our opinion, the interest acquired by the 
plaintiffs in their father's estate upon his death 
was not the kind of vested right protected from 
the entry of a nunc pro tunc decree." 
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the trial court 
and held that the entry of the Washington divorce nunc 
pro tunc had the effect of validating the marriage of the 
defendant with the decedent, John Kelley. It also held 
that it had the effect of revoking the will of the decedent. 
For other cases announcing the same principles, see 
Abramson vs. Abramson, App. D.C. 193; 49 F.2d 501 and 
111 ock vs. Chaney, 36 Colo. 60, 87 P. 538. 
For cases recognizing and upholding the power of 
a court to enter a final decree of divorce nunc pro tunc 
with out the aid of a statute such as that in effect in the 
State of California and the State of Washington, see 
Snodgras vs. Snodgras, 85 Ohio App. 285, 88 N.E.2d 616 
(1948); Perdew vs. Perdew, 99 Colo. 5-1-±, 64 P.2d 602. 
·The Utah Supre1ne Court in the case of Anderson 
vs. Anderson, 121 U. 237, :2±0 P.:2d 966 in considering the 
presu1nption of the validity of a second 1narriage said: 
''The presumption of the Yalidity of a second 
1narriage is one of the strongest disputable pre-
sumptions known in law. It is not to be broken 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in upon or shaken by a mere balance of probabil-
ity. The court held that the evidence to overcome 
this presumption must be clear and convincing." 
The validity of the marriage of Howard Cahoon and 
Dorothy Cahoon is to be determined by Utah law. In 
accordance with the authorities cited above the Utah law 
refers us to the California law to determine what. the 
legal effect of the California decree of divorce was. Un-
der the California law, entering the final decree nunc pro 
tunc had the effect of declaring that the status of Mrs. 
Cahoon was that of a single person at the time she mar-
ried Howard Cahoon. The effect of that was to validate 
the marriage unless that by so doing it would be against 
the public policy of the State of Utah. As shown by the 
Anderson case cited above the policy of Utah law is to 
validate a marriage where that is possible. It is also the 
policy of Utah law to legitimate children and not to de-
clare void a marriage and there by bastardize the children. 
Under the facts of this case, there is no reason at all for 
the Utah law not to give the same effect to the entry 
of the California decree of divorce nunc pro tunc as it 
is given under California law and thereby give full faith 
and credit to the California decree. 
Article IV Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United 
States provides "full faith and credit shall be given in 
each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceed-
ings of every other state. And the Congress may by 
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, 
records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect 
thereof." 28 U.S.C.A. 1738 provides in substance that the 
judicial proceedings of a state shall have the same full 
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faith and credit in every court within the United States 
and its territories and possessions as they have by law 
or usage in the courts of such state, territory, or posses-
sion from which they are taken. 
We submit that under the cases cited above the mar-
riage of Howard Cahoon and Dorothy Cahoon was valid. 
POINT II 
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION IS REC-
OGNIZED UNDER NEVADA LAW AND UTAH LAW AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE RECOVERED IN SUCH 
ACTION. (SEE DEFENDANT'S POINTS II AND III) 
The Nevada Supreme Court recognized that the ac-
tion of criminal conversation exists under Nevada law 
in the case of Rehling vs. Brainard, 114 P. 167, 38 Nev. 
16. The action of criminal conversation concededly has 
not been abolished in the State of Nevada. 
The defendant claims that when the common law v.-as 
adopted in Utah by statute in 1898 that such adoption 
meant the con1mon law as it existed in England as of 
1898. When we adopted the cmmnon law in 1898, did we 
Inean the common law as it existed in England as of that 
time or did \Ye Inean the cormnon law which generally pre-
vailed in this country as of 1898? Our Supreme Court has 
held in the case of Hatch l'. Hatch, 46 F. 116, l±S P. 
1096 ( 1915) that the connnon law that \Yas adopted in 
Utah was the co1nmon law that generally prevailed in this 
country and not necessaril~T as it existed in Great Britain. 
The Utah Court said at page 1100, 
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"Our conclusion, therefore, is that, while 
Congress, by extending over the territory of Utah 
the Constitution and Laws of the United States, 
put in force, in the language of the Suprerne 
Court of the United States, 'the system of common 
law and equity which generally prevails in this 
country', yet did not so extend or transplant the 
common law of England, with all its rigor and 
harshness, but only so much of it as was and had 
been generally recognized and enforced in this 
country, and as is and was suitable to our condi-
tions. There is much to support the view that when 
the colonists left Great Britain they brought with 
them and adopted, so far as suitable to their new 
conditions and surroundings, the usages and cus-
toms then prevailing in Great Britain. There is 
no good reason, however, for saying that as to 
those who migrated from the states and settled in 
territory never under the British dominion." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the Hatch case cited the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case 
known as Mormon Church vs. United States, 136 U.S. 62, 
10 S. Ct. 792, 34 L. Ed. 481, where the court said, 
"But it is apparent from the language of the 
Organic Act, which was passed September 9, 1850, 
* * * that it was the intention of Congress that the 
system of common law and equity which generally 
prevails in this country should be operative in the 
territory of Utah, except as it might be altered by 
legislation. * * * In view of these significant pro-
visions, we infer that the general system of com-
mon law and equity, as it prevails in this country, 
is the basis of the law of Utah." 
It should be noted that the Organic Act of 1850 de-
clared that the Constitution and laws of the United State::; 
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extended over the territory of Utah. The Matrimonial 
Causes Act, that was adopted in England and upon which 
the defendant relies, was not enacted until 1857. Since 
the common law that was adopted in Utah was the com-
mon law that generally prevailed in this country it cannot 
be claimed that the Matrimonial Causes Act adopted in 
1857 in England could have effect in this state. 
It is conceded by defendant that virtually all of the 
States in the United States recognize the common law 
action for criminal conversation. The only states that do 
not recognize that action are the ones that have abolished 
it by statute. 
The following is said in the footnotes of 27 .Am. Jur. 
Sec. 535, page 135, 
"In England although the common law action 
for criminal conversation was abolished by Sec-
tion 59 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, yet by 
Section 28 and 33 of that Act the husband may, 
on a petition against the adulterer alone, or upon 
joining him as correspondent in a petition against 
his wife for dissolution of the n1arriage, reco-ver 
damages assessed by a jury as in an action at law. 
There is, in other words, no obligation of the 
husband's right of action against the adulterer, 
but only a change as to the fonn of remedy. It 
also leaves unaffected his cause of action for en-
ticing his wife to abandon him, or to recover for 
loss of consortiun1 when caused by physical injury 
to her person. Nolin vs. Pierson. 191 ~Iass, 283, 
77 N. E. 890." 
uBurnstein vs. Burnste·i·n, (1893) 12 Eng. Rul, 
Cas. 783, held that claims for damages against the 
correspondent in a divorce proceeding under the 
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Matrimonial Causes Act are to be tried on the 
same principles and in the same manner as com-
mon law actions for criminal conversation." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in several cases, 
Wilson v. Oldroyd, 267 P.2d 759, 1 U.2d 362, 8adleir v. 
Knapton, 296 P.2d 278, 5 U.2d 33, that an action for 
alienation of affections is recognized in Utah. It certainly, 
therefore, would not be against the public policy of the 
State of Utah to recognize an action for criminal conver-
sation. Many states, that have abolished by statute the 
action for alienation of affections have retained and re-
fused to abolish the action for criminal conversation. 
Among such states are Pennsylvania and Nevada. The 
policy favoring the action of criminal conversation is well 
stated in 27 Am. Jur, Sec. 535, page 135, where it is 
stated, 
"A fundamental right which flows from the 
relation of marriage, and one which the well being 
of society requires shall be maintained inviolate, 
is that of one spouse to have exclusive marital 
intercourse with the other, and whenever a third 
person commits adultery with either spouse, he or 
she commits a tortious invasion of the rights of 
the other spouse, from which a cause of action for 
criminal conversation arises. 
The legislature by enacting Section 78-7-4, U.C.A., 1953, 
has recognized that the action for criminal conversation 
does exist in the State of Utah. That statute provides, 
"In an action of divorce, criminal conversa-
tion, seduction, abortion, rape or assault with in-
tent to commit rape, the court may, in its discre-
tion, exclude all persons who are not directly 
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interested therein, except jurors, witnesses and 
officers of the courts; and in any cause the court 
may in its discretion during the examination of 
the witness exclude any and all other witnesses 
in the case." 
See the discussion of the term "criminal conversa-
tion" as used in this statute in State v. Beckstead, 96 U. 
528, 88 p. 2d 461. 
We think that our discussion regarding defendant's 
claim that the action of criminal conversation does not 
exist in the State of Utah pretty much disposes of the 
defendant's claim that punitive damages are not recover-
able in Utah in an action for criminal conversation. If the 
action is recognized in Utah, as we think it definitely is, 
and if punitive damages are recoverable in an action 
for alienation of affections as they definitel:- are, Wilson 
v. Oldroyd, supra, we can see no good reason why puni-
tive damages should not be recoverable in an action for 
criminal conversation. Most states pernrit the recovery 
of punitive dan1ages in an action for crnninal conversa-
tion, 27 Am. Jur., Sec. 5±6, page 146. 31 ~\_.L.R. 2d 725 
states the rule as follows: 
"It has generally been held in this country 
that punitive or exeinplary da1nages are recover-
able in an action for crnninal conversation." 
27 Am. J ur., Sec. 55:2, page 153, states, "The law 
presumes malice fr01n crilninal conversation, in an action 
therefor." 
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POINT III 
'THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS 
TIMELY. 
Judgment was entered after the first trial by the 
clerk in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $25,000 
(R. 70). The court in its memorandum decision, dated 
May 20, 1958, ordered a remititur or a new trial (R. 7 4, 
75). Plaintiff refused to remit and the court on June 
3, 1958, entered its order granting defendant a new trial. 
An examination of the judgment on the verdict dated 
April 17, 1958, shows that a judgment of no cause of 
action was not entered on the first cause of action for 
alienation of affections. On September 5, 1958, plaintiff, 
upon discovering that such a judgment had not been 
entered on the first cause of action, prepared such a 
judgment and with the approval of the court had it signed 
by the clerk. Immediately following the signing and the 
filing of that judgment, plaintiff filed a motion for a 
new trial on the cause of action for alienation of affec-
tions. That motion was argued on September 9, 1958, 
and an order granting a new trial on the first cause of 
action was entered on September 11, 1958. (R. 81). The 
Utah Supreme Court has considered two cases involv-
ing a "judgment on verdict" that was exactly the same 
as the April 17, 1958, judgment that was entered in this 
case. Those cases are K ourbetis v. National Copper Bank, 
264 P. 724, 71 U. 232 and Ellinwood v. Bennion, 276 P. 
159, 73 U. 563. The judgments in the two cases cited 
contained recitals of the jury verdict, but when they 
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got to the "wherefore clause'' of the judgment or the 
''decretal'' part they did not order adjudge and decree 
and settle the rights between the parties. The court in 
both the Kourbetis and Ellinwood case held the judg-
lnents were not final judgments from which an appeal 
would lie. 49 C.J.S., Sec. 71, page 190, states the rule 
as follows, 
"While under code practice a recital of facts 
in a equitable decree is usual and proper, only 
the decretal part of the decree determines the 
rights of the parties and constitutes the final 
judgment in the case." 
There having been no final judgment entered on April 
17, 1958, and none having been entered until September 
5, 1958, plaintiff's motion for new trial on the first cause 
of action for alienation of affections having been filed 
on September 5, 1958, immediately following the entry 
of the judgment was timely. See Rule 54(a) and 59(b) 
URCP. 
B. THE EFFECT OF THE ·COURTS ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS TO 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON BOTH CAUSES OF AC-
TION. 
In any event the effect of the order of the trial court 
contained in its me1norandun1 decision of ~lay 20, 1958, 
and the order dated June 3, 1958, granting the new trial 
was to grant a new trial as to the entire case. See 66 
C.J.S., Sec. 210, page 541 where the rule is stated: 
"An order for a new trial in general tenns, 
not expressly lilnited to particular issues or 
parties, opens up the whole case for further pro-
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ceedings, even though the ground on which the 
new trial is based affects a part of the issues 
only, provided the order for the new trial does 
not restrict it to those issues and the presumption 
is against such restrictions." 
See Cramer v. Bock, 21 Wash. 2d 13, 149 P. 2d 525, 
where the court cites 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec. 
1228 as follows, 
"The right to limit the issues when ordering 
a new trial should be exercised only when it is 
clear that no injustice will result from so doing. 
As much more of the case must be retried as 
may be necessary in order to afford the parties a 
fair trial. Generally, it may be said before a 
partial new trial may properly be granted, it 
should clearly appear that the issue to be retried 
is so distinct and separable from the others that 
a trial of it alone may be had without injustice 
and without danger of complication with other 
matters." 
In 66 C.J.S., Sec. 11, page 99, the rule is stated, 
"Where there are distinct counts or causes 
of action and separate findings, there may be a 
new trial as to a part only of such counts or 
causes, where this can be done without danger of 
confusion or prejudice. On the other hand, where 
the two causes of action stated in the complaint 
arose out of the same transaction, it is within 
the discretion of the trial court to grant a new 
trial on the whole issue * * * and a new trial as 
to all issues has been required where the verdicts 
on the several causes of action are inconsistent 
with one another and the evidence in support 
of all the causes is substantially similar. 
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C. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT 
MRS. CAHOON'S AFFECTIONS WERE ALIENATED 
OUTSIDE THE ST~TE OF NEVADA. 
In so far as the activities of Mr. Pelton and Mrs. 
Cahoon in the State of Utah are concerned, the evidence 
shows the following. Mrs. Cahoon was in Salt Lake for 
three or four weeks in June or July, 1955, (R. 363, 472). 
Mrs. Cahoon was here in Salt Lake for one week during 
Christmas 1955 and was here for three or four weeks in 
June or July of 1956 which was just a month before 
plaintiff learned of the relationship between defendant 
and plaintiff's wife. (R. 363, 472, 473). Defendant went 
horseback riding with Mrs. Cahoon in Evanston, Wyo-
ming, kissed her while she was here in the summer of 
1955 and 1956. (R. 341, 342, 357, 592). Defendant took her 
to the Variety Club in Salt Lake in the summer of 1956 
where he was observed with his arms around her, kissing 
her and having drinks with her. (R. 246, 561). Defend-
ant wrote letters fron1 Salt Lake addressed to !:Irs. 
Cahoon, sent her a bathing suit for her birthday, a valen-
tine card and called her on the telephone from Salt Lake. 
(R. 334-337, 588). Defendant refused to testify and 
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination when 
asked "\vhether or not he had had sexual intercourse \\'i.th 
Mrs. Cahoon while she was in Salt Lake in the summer 
of 1955, in December of 1955 and in the summer of 1956. 
(R. 3-l-2-34-l, 594). The evidence shows that the last time 
defendant and !:Irs. Cahoon saw each other prior to the 
tilne Mrs. Cahoon and the plaintiff separated was while 
Mrs. Cahoon was here in the smnn1er of 1956. 'y e submit 
that under the circun1stances of this case there is ample 
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evidence from which the jury could find that the acts 
that occurred outside the State of Nevada were a sub-
stantial factor in alienating the affections of plaintiff's 
wife. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO GIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 11. 
(R. 124-125). 
Defendant's exceptions to Instruction No. 11 are 
contained on pages 707 and 708 of the record. Defendant 
did not take exception to the instruction on any ground 
that is now raised by defendant in his Point No. V as 
being prejudicial error. Having failed to properly except 
to the instruction, the defendant cannot now claim it is 
erroneous. Furthermore an examination of instruction 
No. 11 as a whole shows the jury could not have been 
misled by it. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM BRINGING 'THE 
_AiCTIONS IN QUESTION BE;CAUSE OF THE FACT THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE OBTAINED THE DIVORCE. 
Defendant claims that plaintiff is barred from bring-
ing the actions in question because of the fact that plain-
tiff's wife obtained the divorce. 
Defendant recognizes that the court in the case of 
Sadlier v. Knapton, 5 U. 2d 33, P. 2d 278, has held 
specifically that the fact that the wife obtains the divorce 
does not preclude the husband from maintaining an action 
against a third party for alienation of affections. That 
case is the law of this State. 
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POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
FOR FUTURE OR PERMANENT LOSS OF HIS WIFE'S 
SERVICES, AFFECTION, CONSORTIUM AND SOCIETY. 
(SEE DEFENDANT'S POINT VII) 
Defendant claims that plaintiff could only recover 
for loss of services, affection, consortium, companionship 
and society of his wife down to the time of the divorce. 
It should be noted that the -cases cited by defendant 
in support of that argument are extremely old cases. 
The court in the case of Wilson v. Oldroyd, supra, 
has decided this point and in so doing used the following 
language, 
"No one will gainsay that the task of placing 
a monetary value upon the affections of a v~ife 
is fraught with grave difficulty. The valuation 
is of course not on a strictly out of pocket basis 
and cannot be computed solely from contributions 
of money to be expected, nor the value of domestic 
services alone. There are other intangible but 
definite values in the comfort and society, love 
and con1panionship, and other privileges attend-
ant upon the estate of marriage for which compen-
sation can be awarded, not only up to the time of 
divorce, but for permanent loss of such conjugal 
rights." 
The Utah Court cites Restate1nent of Torts, Sec. 
910, page 559 and Riggs v. Sm,iJth, 52 Idaho 43, 11 P. 2d 
358 in support of that holding. The Idaho case states 
the rule as follows, 
"The plaintiff is not linrited to a recovery 
of dmnages measured by the loss of consortimu 
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down to the date of the commencement of the 
action, but is entitled to damages measured by 
the permanent loss of the spouse's aid, comfort 
and companionship." 
See also Genness v. Simpson, 78 A. 886, 84 Vt. 127; 
Bryant v. Carrier, 198 S.E. 619, 214 N.C. 191; 42 C.J.S., 
Sec. 706, page 361. 
POINT VII 
rT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE LIFE EXPECT ANGY TABLE NOR TO 
PERMIT COUNSEL TO ARGUE THE SAME TO THE JURY. 
The defendant cites Johnson v. Richards, 50 Idaho 
150, 294 P. 507, as authority for the argument that the 
mortality tables are inadmissible. The court in the case 
of Fife v. Adair, 47 P. 2d 145, 173 Okl. 234, in an action 
by a wife for the alienation of her husband's affections 
had occasion to consider the same question and in so 
doing discussed the Idaho case. After quoting that part 
of the Idaho case which is quoted verbatim in defend-
ant's brief, page 45, the Oklahoma Court said, 
"To follow this case would be to hold that 
the tables are not admissible in any kind of action 
for the loss of support. The court in the Johnson 
case says that to so hold would base a presump-
tion upon a presumption. That is, that the marital 
relation once shown would continue to exist until 
death and that the love and affection would like-
wise continue until the death of one of them. This 
court has held in a number of cases that in an 
action for damages for the loss of support on 
account of personal injury the American Mor-
tality Tables are competent evidence for the con-
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sideration of the jury along with the other evi-
dence for what ever probative value they may 
have. City of Shawnee et al. v. Slankard, 29 Okl. 
page 133, 116 P. 803, syllabus : 'The expectation 
of life of one injured by another's negligence may 
be shown as a basis for the estimation of damages 
in a case where the evidence tends to show the 
injury is permanent, and standard tables of mor-
tality are admissible in evidence upon this 
question.' 
"The loss of support is an element of damage 
in this case. 'To hold that the American Tables of 
Mortality are not admissible for the reason that 
it would base a presumption upon a presumption 
would overrule and set aside every case by this 
court wherein it has been held that such tables 
are admissible to prove expectation of life where 
loss of support was an element of damages. In 
a personal injury case, it would be contended 
with equal force that you would first have to 
presume marital relation would continue until 
death, and the further presumption of continua-
tion of support. Adair was not a "\\itness in this 
case ; in determining the question of the amount 
plaintiff would be entitled to recover for the loss 
of the support of her husband, certainly the jury 
would be entitled to know son1ething as to his 
age and condition of health. A larger sum should 
be allowed for the loss of a husband who is young 
and vigorous than an older one whose earning 
capacity- would not be as great on account of his 
age and condition of health. These tables are not 
admitted in evidence as absolute guides to control 
the decision of the jury, but for whatever w-eight 
the jury 1uay give the1n along ''ith the other 
evidence in the case." 
The Utah Supren1e Court has held in a number of 
cases that the 1nortality tables are ad1nissible. See Ben-
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nett v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company7 213 P. 2d 325, 117 U. 57; Shields v. Utah Light 
Traction Co.7 99 U. 307, 105 P. 2d 327; Schlatter v. 
McCarthy7 113 U. 543, 196 P. 2d 968. 
In view of the ruling by the Idaho Court in the 
later case of Riggs v. Sm.ith7 supra, to the effect that 
permanent loss of services are recoverable in an aliena-
tion of affections action, it is doubtful that the Idaho 
Court would follow the Johnson case again. 
It has not been followed by any other court and 
has been rejected by the Oklahoma court. 
The holding of the Johnson case to the effect that 
the mortality tables are inadmissible because it permits 
a presumption to be based upon a presumption is plainly 
wrong. As pointed out by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 
exactly the same argument could be made to the admissi-
bility of the tables in a wrongful death or personal injury 
action. As noted, Utah in a long line of decisions, has 
admitted the tables in wrongful death and personal injury 
actions. 
As to defendant's claim that it was improper for 
plaintiff's counsel to argue the mortality tables to the 
jury, it should be noted first of all that during the 
argument defendant did not object to plaintiff's argu-
ment concerning the mortality tables. The only objection 
that was made was after the argument had been com-
pleted. Defendant did except, (R. 713, 714) to such argu-
ment by plaintiff, but did not object during the course 
of it. The cases cited by defendant to the effect that 
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such an argument may not be made are cases dealing 
with an argument concerning damages for pain, suffering 
and so forth on a per diem basis. Those cases have 
nothing to do with an argument involving the damages for 
loss of services. 
Wilson v. Oldroyd) supra, holds that the husband, in 
an alienation of affections actions, may recover for 
permanent loss of services of his wife. There is no differ-
ence in permitting use of the mortality tables as an aid 
to the jury in estimating damages for loss of services 
in an alienation of affections action and a personal injury 
or death action. That such tables may be used under 
Utah law, see: Mitchell v. Arrowhead Freight Lines) Ltd., 
214 P. 2d 620, 117 TJ. 224. 
POINT VIII 
IF THE .COS'T OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S WIFE 
IS AN OFFSET AT ALL, IT MAY ONLY BE OFFSET A-
GAINST THE $2,500 THAT WAS AWARDED ON THE CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. 
The trial court offset the cost of support against 
only the $2,500 awarded for alienation of affections on 
the theor~r that the value of the duty to support could 
be best offset onl~~ against the value of lost services, 
and that, loss of services ,,~as. by the instruction, an 
element of damages in the cause of action for alienation 
of affections, but not an element of dan1ages in the case 
of criminal conversation. 
Instruction No. 12 (R. 126) states the measure of 
da~nages for criminal conversation and it should be noted 
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from that instruction that the jury was permitted to take 
into account only the shame and ridicule which the hus-
band would be subjected to and the mental anguish and 
distress which he would necessarily suffer by reason 
of said illicit conduct on the part of the one who had 
relations with his wife. Instruction No. 13 which pertains 
to alienation of affections specifically states that in 
fixing the amount of plaintiff's damages for that cause 
of action the jury may take into account loss of compan-
ionship, aid, society and services of the wife. Defendant 
did not take exception in any way to the court's Instruc-
tion No. 12 which pertains to the measure of damage 
for criminal conversation. (R. 707-710). It should also be 
noted that defendant took the position at trial that the 
value of the husband's duty to support would be deducti-
ble from the value of the lost services. On page 708 of 
the record the defendant's counsel took exception to 
Instruction No. 13 and in so doing said, 
"On the ground that the instruction does not 
charge the jury that they must take into account 
in determining the value of lost services, if any, 
the value of the husband's duty to support. It is 
defendant's contention that the law is that the 
measure of damages is the value of the lost 
services less the value of the husband's duty to 
support." 
If there was any error in the court refusing to permit 
the jury to consider loss of services in arriving at its 
award of damages for criminal conversation, that error 
has been waived by defendant's failure to take exception 
to Instrument No. 12 and furthermore that error was an 
error in favor of the defendant of which he may not 
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now complain. If anyone was prejudiced by not permit-
ting the jury to consider loss of services on the cause 
of action for criminal conversation, it was the plaintiff, 
not the defendant. 
The defendant claims that it was the intention of 
the jury that the amount of $17,000 support should be 
deducted from the entire verdict. During plaintiff's argu-
ment to the jury it was mentioned by plaintiff's counsel 
that the court wanted the jury to find the amount of the 
support and that it would be deducted from the award 
that was made. The court interrupted counsel for the 
plaintiff and stated that it did not know whether the 
cost of support would be deducted or not but that that 
would be a matter of law to be determined at a later 
date. The court told the jury that all he wanted it to do 
was to find the amount. (R. 714, 715). 
For the defendant to now claim that the cost of 
support should be deducted from anything other than 
the award on the cause of action where th~ value of 
services was taken into account as an element of damage 
is as inconsistent as it is to now argue that the jury 
was in fact permitted to consider loss of sernces as an 
element of da1nage under Instruction X o. 1~ on the cause 
of action for criminal conversation. 
The case of Prettyman r. Tri1li~amson. 39 A. 731 
(Dela.) which has been cited at great length by defendant 
also states in substance that the Yalue of a wife ·s services 
is to be reduced h)~ the value of the performance of the 
husband's dnt)r to support, cloth and care for her. 
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The cost of support of plaintiff's wife should not 
be an offset at all. The $2,500 that was awarded on 
the cause of action for alienation of affections should be 
reinstated and in any event if the cost of support is 
held to be deductible it should only be offset against 
the $2,500 awarded on the cause of action where loss 
of services were taken into acount. The cases cited by 
defendant, Rash v. Pratt, 111 A. 225; Allen v. Rossi, 
146 A. 692, so hold. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT CORRECTLY PERMITTED PLAINTIFF TO 
READ DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES IN WHICH 'THE 
WITNESSES CLAIMED THEIR P R IV I L E G E AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION. (SEE DEFENDANT'S POINT X 
AND XI) 
During the first trial a conference took place in 
the judge's chambers resulting, after request of the de-
fendant, in the plaintiff not being permitted to require 
the defendant to claim his privilege against self-incrimin-
ation while on the witness stand. (R. 320-330). Pursuant 
to direction of the trial court in chambers, it was under-
stood if the defendant wanted to claim his privilege 
against self-incrimination that all that was necessary 
was for defendant's counsel to say in substance, "I object 
on the grounds previously stated" and that would let 
the court know that the defendant was claiming his 
privilege. The defendant does not complain of what took 
place at the first trial as well he cannot, with respect 
to the matter of the defendant claiming his privilege 
against self-incrimination. We believe the trial court 
was in error in not permitting plaintiff at the first trial 
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to ask the defendant questions on the stand and compel 
him to claim his privilege in so many words in the pres-
ence of the jury. However that was error that operated 
to the benefit of the defendant. We point it out only 
for the purpose of showing what occurred at the first 
trial as distinguished from what took place at the second 
trial. The defendant failed to appear at all at the second 
trial, and it was necessary for plaintiff to read the testi-
mony of the defendant as it was given at the first trial. 
In addition to reading that testimony plaintiff read 
certain parts of defendant's deposition where the de-
fendant claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. 
It is not only proper to require a party to claim his 
privilege before the jury but in addition to that an infer-
ence may be drawn, from the fact that a party refuses 
to testify on the ground of privilege, adverse to the party 
so refusing. Many cases have been decided so holding. 
In Re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 209 P. 353, Fish v. State 
Bar of Californi'a, 214 Cal. 215, 4 P. 2d 937, and In Re 
Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.\Y. 2d 657, were cases 
involving disbarment proceedings against an attorney. 
The court in those cases held that a disbarment pro-
ceeding was not a criminal proceeding but '\Yas a special 
proceeding of a civil nature. Each court held that the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination did 
not extend to protect the attorney from being called as 
a witness. It was also held that while the attorney could 
be called as a witness and could be asked questions, he 
would be pennitted to refuse to answer the questions on 
the ground that his testinwny would tend to incriminate 
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him, but if he failed to testify an inference adverse to 
him could be drawn. 
There are many other cases holding that when a 
party to a civil action claims his privilege an adverse 
inference may be drawn therefrom. See Fross v. Wotton, 
3 Cal. 2d 384,44 P. 2d 350; Stillman Pond, Inc. v. Watson, 
115 Cal. App. 2d 440, 252 P. 2d 717; Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 
Wash. 2d 449, 261 P. 2d 684. 
The Stillman Pond case and the Fross case, both 
from California, are discussed in the Washington case. 
The Supreme Court of Washington in the Ikeda case 
in holding that an inference may be drawn against a party 
who claims the privilege against self-incrimination in a 
civil action, had the following to say, 
"The purpose of the privilege against self-
incrimination is to protect the witness from com-
pulsory disclosure of criminal liability. When a 
witness in a civil suit refuses to answer a question 
on the ground that his answer might tend to 
incriminate him, the result sought to be achieved 
by invoking the constitutional privilege is ac-
complished. Such refusal cannot be used against 
him in a subsequent criminal proceeding. How-
ever, the trier of facts in a civil case is entitled 
to draw an inference from his refusal to so testify. 
Fross v. Wotton, 3 Cal. 2d 384, 44 P. 2d 350, 354, 
was a fraud case. The defendant claimed the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and refused 
to answer certain questions. The court, in ruling 
upon the question of whether or not an inference 
could be drawn from such refusal, said: 'We are 
here met by the argument that it is a violation of 
the constitutional privilege to draw an inference 
from the refusal to testify when put upon the 
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ground of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
However, we do not think the inference here drawn 
constitutes a denial or invasion of that privilege. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
" '* * * The privilege is not for the benefit of 
the guilty nor to enable the claimant to prevail 
in civil suits by means of it. The privilege is to 
be protected from compulsory disclosure of crim-
inal liability or facts connecting the claimant with 
the crime. See In Re Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37, 
287 P. (125) 126. 'To hold that no inference could 
be drawn from the refusal of these witnesses to 
explain their dealings, in the face of so many 
suspicious circumstances, would be an unjustifi-
able extension of the privilege for a purpose it 
was never intended to fulfill.' 
"Stillman Pond, Inc. v. \Yatson, 115 Cal. App. 
2d 440, 252 P. 2d 717, 718, was an action for a 
writ of mandate to compel the real estate commis-
sion to vacate an order revoking a real estate 
broker's license. In an appeal from an order re-
voking the license the court said: 
"'When Pond, as a "itness on cross-examin-
ation, was asked w·hat he did with the money he 
received as a deposit on the sale of the Rites, 
lot, he refused to ans·wer on the ground that 
answering the question would tend to incriminate 
him. One of the issues was whether Pond com-
mingled the deposit nwney with his money. The 
question which he refused to answer related dir-
ectly to that issue. An inference could be drawn 
fron1 his refusal to answer said question that he 
did not in1n1ediately place the deposit n10ney in 
a neutral escrow depository or in the hands of 
principals or Inaintain a trust fund account ·with 
a bank or a recognized depository. See Fross Y. 
\V otton, 3 Cal. ~d 384, 395, 44 P. 2d 350.' 
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"See also McCoo vs. Dighton, S. & S. Street 
Railway Co., 173 Mass. 117, 53 N.E. 134, wherein 
the court said : 
"'* * * In a civil case, if one of the parties 
insists upon his privilege to exclude testimony 
that would throw light upon the merits of the case 
and the truth of the testimony, we are of opinion 
that it is a proper subject for comment. Andrews 
vs. Frye, 104 Mass. 234, 236. See Commonwealth 
vs. Smith, 163 ::Mass. 411, 430 et seq., 40 N.E. 189. 
This being so, it was proper for the court to com-
pel the plaintiff to take the full responsibility of 
the choice.' 
"Appellant's refusal to testify, taken alone, 
would not justify a finding that prostitution was 
practiced in the hotel from which she received a 
monetary benefit. However, an inference may be 
drawn from her refusal to so testify, which may 
be coupled with, and considered with, proper and 
relevent evidence to prove such fact." 
See the excellent discussion of ''Consequences of 
Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" in 
Volume 24 Chicago Law Review, page 472. At page 477 
the rule is stated as follows: 
"Therefore, if evidence is introduced in a civil 
action tending to indicate that one of the parties 
has been guilty of a criminal act, and that party, 
by exercising his self-incrimination privilege as a 
witness, refuses to refute or deny such evidence, 
the court or jury may infer that the adverse evi-
dence and its implications are true, but it is the 
failure to contradict the adverse evidence, not the 
exercise of the privilege, that produces the infer-
ence." 
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Defendant claims it was error for plaintiff to read 
the deposition of Mrs. Cahoon. Defendant as part of his 
defense read a substantial part from Mrs. Cahoon's de-
position as is shown by the record beginning at page 624. 
Plaintiff read the deposition of Mrs. Cahoon where she 
claimed the privilege against self-incrimrnation beginning 
at page 644 of the record to page 648. Defendant did not 
object to the reading of Mrs. Cahoon's deposition. (R. 
644). Likewise defendant did not make a motion to strike 
such testimony nor did defendant request an instruction 
to the effect that no adverse inference could be drawn 
against the defendant from the fact that Mrs. Cahoon 
claimed her privilege against self-incrimination or that 
she refused to ans·wer certain questions. (R. 92-115). For 
these reasons alone the testimony read from the deposi-
tion of Mrs. Cahoon cannot be prejudicial error. 
The cases cited by defendant in support of the claim 
that it was improper to read from the deposition of Mrs. 
Cahoon where the privilege was claimed, are distinguish-
able. The Masterson case, the Barnhart case and the Frye 
case cited by defendant were all cases where the witness 
was asked if he had clain1ed his prh'ilege against self-
incrimination at a prior tilne, the sole purpose being to 
impeach the ·witness. In the case no,,- before this court 
that was not done. The only thing that was done was to 
read the deposition of the witness. which plaintiff had a 
right to do, inas1nuch as the witness was not present at 
trial and was not within the State of lTtah, Rule 26 (d) (3) 
URCP. The defendant on page 53 of his brief concedes 
that plaintiff has the right to question a witness on the 
witness stand about 1natters which 1nay result in a claim 
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of privilege. That we are sure is correct. If the defendant 
or Mrs. Cahoon had been there, we certainly could have 
put both of them on the stand and could have asked them 
questions that would have resulted in the claim of privi-
lege before the jury. Inasmuch as they were not there, we 
exercised our right to use their deposition at the trial. 
Morris vs. McClella;n, 154 Ala. 639, 45 S. 641 (1908) is a 
case directly in point. That was an action to recover dam-
ages for assault and battery. In this case the plaintiff 
served interrogatories upon the defendant. Some of the 
questions were answered by the defendant and others he 
refused to answer on the ground that to answer them 
might incriminate him. At the trial of the case plaintiff 
read the interrogatories together with the answers to 
certain questions and the refusal to answer others to the 
jury. The defendant's refusal to answer certain questions 
was the subject of comment in argument by counsel to the 
jury. The court said, 
"'The question is now presented whether it 
was permissible for the plaintiff, over the defend-
ant's objection to read to the jury those interrog-
atories which the defendant refused to answer, 
and the defendant's ground of refusal, and to com-
ment on the same in argument. In criminal pro-
secution the failure or refusal of the defendant 
to testify cannot be commented on in argument; 
but we know of no authority applying this rule 
to civil actions, nor do we see any reason for so 
doing. The plaintiff in a civil action has rights, 
as well as the defendant; and one of these rights 
is to secure evidence to support his cause in court, 
even to calling upon the defendant as a witness to 
supply it. It has always been the rule in civil ac-
tions that the failure of a party to the suit, when 
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present at the trial, to testify as to a fact in issue, 
furnished legitimate ground of comment in argu~ 
ment to the jury by the opposite party. The de-
fendant availed himself of his constitutional right 
of refusal to answer on the grounds stated, and he 
had his benefit and protection from prosecution 
in exercising his privilege; but he could not expect 
to extend this privilege to the deprivation of the 
plaintiff of his right to comment in argument on 
his silence, no matter upon what ground he might 
put it. We are of the opinion that the trial court 
committed no error in its rulings on this question." 
Morgan vs. Kendall, 24 N.E.143, 124 Ind. 454 (1890). 
In this case the court held that where in a civil action for 
assault and battery, the plaintiff calls the defendant as 
a witness, and asks him whether he committed the battery 
complained of, and defendant refuses to answer on the 
ground that his answer might tend to incriminate hiin, 
such refusal is a proper matter to be considered by the 
jury in connection with plaintiff's own testimony that 
defendant committed the battery. 
The court also held that this did not cmnpel the wit-
ness to give evidence against hilnself and in so doing the 
court said, 
"Nor does this holding Yiolate the well known 
rule that a party in a criminal case shall not be 
compelled to furnish eYidenc.e against hilnself: for 
as we have seen, when prosecuted c.rin1inally, his 
conduct in refusing to testif~~ in the civil case can-
not be given in eYidence against hiln." 
See also United States e~r rel Zapp v. Dist1·ict Direc.-
tor of Imm1~rpration, 1:20 Fed.2d 7G2 (Second Circuit 1941). 
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Even if it is assumed that it might have been error, 
which we vigorously deny, to have read Mrs. Cahoon's 
testimony where she claimed the privilege, it still was not 
prejudicial. Mrs. Cahoon was the person with whom the 
defendant was charged with having had illicit sexual 
intercourse. The defendant had already claimed his priv-
ilege and refused to answer as to such intercourse, and as 
seen from the cases cited above an inference adverse to 
him could be drawn from the claiming of such privilege 
or from his refusal to testify. The evidence as to the 
adultery was overwhelming; admissions by both defend-
ant and Mrs. Cahoon of being together and of kissing, 
.evidence that they were alone, testimony of Richard 
Cahoon that defendant admitted the adultery, plus the 
adverse inference that could be drawn form defendant's 
refusal to testify based upon his claiming the privilege. 
The fact that Mrs. Cahoon also claimed the privilege adds 
little to the evidence of adultery. Stated differently would 
the result have been different as to the jury finding 
adultery if the questions had not been read where Mrs. 
Cahoon claimed her privilege. At the first trial the ques-
tions complained of now were not read (R. 415-422). The 
jury found adultery. 
POINT X 
THE COURTS REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20 WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Defendant claims it was error for the court not to 
specifically instruct the jury that the fact that plaintiff's 
wife may have gone out with other men could have been 
considered in mitigation of damages. Such an instruction 
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was given to the jury at the first trial (Instruction No. 9, 
R. 50). At the second trial the court in giving its Instruc-
tion No. 11 in substance covered the matters c~ntained in 
defendant's requested Instruction No. 20. The court in-
structed the jury as follows, 
"Therefore, before you can find that the de-
fendant was guilty of alienation of the affections 
of the wife of Howard B. Cahoon, you must find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
following are true: 
a. That Dorothy Cahoon had affection for 
Howard B. Cahoon. 
b. That the conduct of Robert P. Pelton 
was intentional and was likely to induce Dorothy 
W. Cahoon to lose her affection for Howard B. 
Cahoon. 
c. That Dorothy W. Cahoon did lose her 
love and affection for Howard B. Cahoon. 
b. That the conduct of Robert P. Pelton 
was the controlling cause ·which induced Dorothy 
W. Cahoon to lose son1e or all of her love and 
affection for Howard B. Cahoon and that without 
such conduct she would not have lost any of her 
affection and loYe for the said Howard B. Cahoon. 
If you believe and find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that there was affection between 
plaintiff and his wife. whether it was great or 
small, and that defendant intentionally interferred 
with, lessened, or destro~~ed such affection or in-
terferred with, lessened or destroYed anY chance 
of plaintiff and his wife oYerco~ing a~y diffi-
culties that Pxisted bet"~een them (if you find any 
such diffirnlties did exist), then you must find 
that the defendant did alienate the affections of 
42 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dorothy W. Cahoon from her husband, Howard 
B. ·Cahoon." 
In Instruction No. 13 the court instructed the jury 
as follows, 
"You are instructed that one who has lost the 
love and affection of his wife because of intention-
al conduct on the part of another man is entitled 
to recover such a sum of money as will fairly and 
reasonably compensate him for any loss of the 
companionship, aid, society and services of his 
wife which he has suffered and is reasonably 
certain to suffer in the future as a proximate re-
sult of the conduct of the other person. 
The above instructions point out quite clearly that 
defendant is only liable for the damages that his own 
conduct has caused. This of necessity excludes any liabil-
ity for loss of affection, companionship or anything else 
that may have been occasioned by Mrs. Cahoon going 
out with men other than the defendant. The instructions 
taken as a whole cover defendant's requested Instruction 
No. 20. 
·As will be observed from the record a good deal of 
the trial was taken up by defendant laboring the point 
that plaintiff's wife had gone out with other men. Defend-
ant's final argument to the jury also stressed that fact 
at great length. 
The jury could very well have found that Mrs. 
Cahoon did not go out with other men. See testimony of 
plaintiff's daughter, Sylvia (R. 515) and of Mrs. Cahoon's 
sister, Evelyn Fisher (R. 697). A careful reading of Rox-
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anne's testimony (R. 281-291, 528) raises substantial 
doubt as to the accuracy of her observations. 
It should be kept in mind that many things may be 
considered by a jury in actions such as are now before 
the court, in mitigation of damages. The defendant took 
every advantage of every mitigating circumstance, such 
as the claimed misconduct of the plaintiff toward Vir-
ginia Holt, plaintiff's wife's sister (R. 398, 670), the 
claim that plaintiff did not show affection to his wife 
and did not have sexual intercourse with her as often as 
he should. (R. 191-203), evidence that plaintiff punched 
his wife in the nose (R. 198, 497), and the claim that 
plaintiff denied paternity of his son (R. 201, 616-623). 
These factors, among others, defendant dwelled on at 
length all during the trial in addition to mentioning at 
every possible place the claim that plaintiff's wife was 
going out with other men. All of them could be and were 
considered by the jury in determining whether or not 
there was affection between plaintiff and his wife and 
all of them could be and were considered by the jury on 
the question of damages. \V e subn1it that it was not neces-
sary for the court to go through and itemize all of the 
various factors that the jury might consider in determin-
ing whether affection existed and in determining the 
amount of damage that was caused by defendant's con-
duct. The instructions given correctly state the law and 
there was no error in refusing to single out and instruct 
on one of various factors that the jury could consider 
in computing damages. 
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POINT XI 
THE GIVING OF- INSTRUCTION NO. 13 WAS NOT PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR. 
Defendant claims that it was improper to permit the 
jury to fix the value of the services, aid and society of 
the plaintiff's wife without any evidence as to that value. 
Schwartz vs. Premium Products, 221 P.2d 334, 98 Cal. 
App.2d 780, holds that in an action for the value of the 
mother's services it was not necessary to put in any evi-
dence. The court in so holding said, 
"Appellants argue that there is no evidence 
as to the value of the mother's services. There need 
not be. The jury may draw on its own knowledge 
of the value of services of that character." 
We submit that the jury is in an excellent position 
to determine the value of services, aid, comfort, society 
and companionship of a wife. The Utah Supreme Court 
felt the same way in Wilson v. Oldroyd, supra, when it 
used the following language. 
"The question of damages in such instance 
seems best addressed to the discretion of a jury; 
they have homes, spouses and children of their 
own, are experienced in practical affairs of daily 
life and have different points of view; and they 
are afforded the benefit of seeing and hearing the 
witnesses. Because of their advantaged position 
courts are extremely reluctant to interfere with 
their verdicts.'' 
Defendant's exceptions to Instruction No. 13 appear 
on pages 708 and 709 of the reeord. Defendant did not 
except to that instruction upon any of the grounds that 
are now claimed as error in defendant's Point XIV. 
45 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT XII 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT A 
NEW TRIAL ON GROUND THAT THE VERDlCT WAS EX-
CESSIVE. 
A full and complete answer to defendant's claim that 
the verdict was excessive, without detailing all the evi-
dence, lies in the fact that two juries have passed on the 
question of damages. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
POINT A 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMI'TED ERROR AS A MATTER 
OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN VACATING 
THE JURY'S AWARD OF $12,000 PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AND SUBSTITUTING $1,000 THEREFOR. AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THE JURY'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
SHOULD BE REINSTATED. 
POINT B 
COST OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S WIFE IS NOT 
DEDUCTIBLE AT ALL. 
POINT C 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A 
NEW TRIAL AT THE <CLOSE OF THE FIRST TRIAL OF 
THIS ACTION. 
The jun~ in the seeond trial returned a verdict of 
$2,500 for alienation of affections, $25,000 for criminal 
conversation and $12,000 punitive damages. The jury 
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also found that the cost of supporting plaintiff's wife 
would have been $17,000. It is plaintiff's position first 
that the cost of support of plaintiff's wife may not be de-
ducted at all and if it is deductible that it may only be 
deducted as the trial court held, from the award that was 
made in the cause of action where the jury was permitted 
to take into account the value of the loss of plaintiff's 
wife's services, namely the cause of action for alienation 
of affections. It is also plaintiff's position that the trial 
court erronously reduced the punitive damages from 
$12,000 to $1,000. 
POINT A 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMI'TED ERROR AS A MATTER 
OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN V ACA'TING 
THE JURY'S AWARD OF $12,000 PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AND SUBSTITUTING $1,000 THEREFOR. AS A MA'TTER OF 
LAW THE JURY'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
SHOULD BE REINSTATED. 
Whether a trial court has abused its discretion in 
vacating the jury's award of punitive damages turns on 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case .. To 
cite other cases from our jurisdiction and other jurisdic-
tions where trial courts have been reversed for vacating 
the juries' awards of punitive damages would serve no 
useful purpose. 
The facts and circumstances of the case before this 
court and in particular the deliberate conduct of the de-
fendant, extending over a period of in excess of twelve 
months, in going secretively to plaintiff's home, making 
love to plaintiff's wife in the sanctity of plaintiff's home 
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and in the presence of plaintiff's children, kissing plain-
tiff's wife in plaintiff's home and in the presence of plain-
tiff's children, drinking with plaintiff's wife in plaintiff's 
home and in the presence of plaintiff's children, taking 
plaintiff's wife openly to public dance halls, taking plain-
tiff's wife openly on excursions, and in debauching and 
defiling plaintiff's wife by having sexual intercourse with 
her on many occasions over a long period of time, and in 
making a deliberate conquest of plaintiff's wife, all in 
complete disregard of the moral standards of society and 
in complete disregard of the sanctity of plaintiff's home 
and marriage, amply supports the jury's award of $12,000 
punitive damages. The la-w permits the jury to award 
punitive da1nages for the purpose of setting a value on 
the moral standards of the conununity and the violation 
thereof, for the purpose of operating as a deterent to 
like conduct by others, and for the purpose of punishing 
the defendant. The very purpose of permitting a jury to 
assess punitive damage is to pernrit a jury of eight rep-
resentatives of the cmnmunity rather than one trial 
judge, whose standard of 1norals and background may be 
different from that of the conununity. to determine the 
value of a deliberate and wilful Yiolation of the standards 
of the communit~~. To pern1it the trial judge on the facts 
and circumstances of this case to vacate the jury's award 
of $12,000 punitive da1nages is to pennit the trial judge 
to arbitrarily and capriciously substitute his standard of 
value of the 1norals of the conununity for that of the jury 
and tlH'rC'b~, to deprive the plaintiff of his right to a trial 
by jury. See E·l 1ans vs. Gaisford, (1952) 122 U. 156, 247 
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P.2d 431 in which this court in discussing punitive dam-
ages said at 247 P.2d, page 435: 
''Punitive or exemplary damages are awarded 
as a punishment to the defendant for malicious 
conduct and as a wholesome warning to defendant 
and others not to engage in similar transactions. 
* * * Because there is no method of precise calc-
ulation as to the quantum of such damages, the 
amount thereof must necessarily be left to the 
sound discretion of the jury as related to the facts 
and circumstances in each individual case. The 
only limitation thereon is that they must not be so 
disproportionate to the injury and the actual dam-
age as to plainly manifest that they were the re-
sult of passion and prejudice rather than reason 
and justice applied to the existing facts.'' 
All that one needs to do in order to determine whether or 
not the jury's award of $12,000 punitive damages was 
"disproportionate to the injuries'' sustained by the plain-
tiff in the case before this court is to contemplate the 
situation of an innocent man whose wife has been deliber-
ately defiled and debauched and the sanctity of whose 
home and family has been violated by the deliberate, 
malicious and persistent conquest of a wrongdoer. 
To permit the trial judge in this case to substitute 
his judgment for the judgment of the jury is to permit 
the trial judge to, "usurp judicial power and prostitute 
the constitutional trial by jury". Uptown Appliance vs. 
Flint (1952) 122 U. 298, 249 P.2d 826. 
POINT B 
COST OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S WIFE IS NOT 
DEDUCTIBLE AT ALL. 
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All of the cases cited by defendant in support of the 
proposition that the cost of supporting the wife is deduct-
ible are old cases. Lankford vs. Tombari, 35 Wash.2d 412, 
213 P.2d 627, involved an action for alienation of affec-
tions and criminal conversation. In that case the defend-
ant requested the following instruction, 
"You are further instructed that in the event 
you find for the plaintiff on the first cause of 
action that the plaintiff is entitled to only one re-
covery for loss of consortium which is made up 
generally of the loss of company, the loss of serv-
ices and plaintiff's mental agony, lacerated feel-
ing, wounded sensibilities and love. 
You are further instructed, however, that as 
to any loss of services there shall be a deduction 
because of the plaintiff's duty to cloth, support 
and care for his wife." 
The Washington Supreme Court said, 
"The requested instruction is not the law and 
it was not error to refuse it.'' 
We think the late \Vashington case correctly states the 
law in holding that a deduction for cost of support should 
not be permitted. It should also be noted that defendant 
has not cited one late ease that holds the cost of support 
may be deducted. The \Yashington case cited above is 
the only case that plaintiff through diligent research 
has been able to find involving the question of whether 
or not eost of supporting a wife is deductible. The fact 
that that issue is not involved in any of the later aliena-
tion of affections or erhninal conversation eases is some-
what significant. It is also significant that the only late 
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case that either defendant or plaintiff has apparently 
been able to find, namely the Washington case cited 
above, holds that the cost of support is not deductible at 
all. 
27 Am. Jur., Sec. 545, page 146 states, 
"There is disagreement as to whether there 
should be a deduction from a husband's recovery 
for loss of his wife's services because of his duty 
to cloth, support and care for her." 
Restatement of Torts, Vol. 3 Sec. 683 (k) states the 
various elements that may be considered in fixing dam-
ages where the husband sues for alienation of his wife's 
affections. Nothing is said about deducting the cost of 
support at all. If cost of support was deductible, the auth-
ors of the Restatement certainly would have said some-
thing about it. Section 685 (e) of the same volume of the 
Restatement in discussing the elements of damage in an 
action for criminal conversation is likewise silent as to 
the deductiblity of cost of support. 
POINT C 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI~CIAL ER-
ROR AND ABUSED I'TS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A 
NEW TRIAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE FIRST TRIAL OF 
THIS ACTION. 
If, but only if, the court should determine that pre-
judicial error of some kind was committed at the second 
trial that would require a reversal, then plaintiff urges 
the court to reinstate the verdict of the jury that was re-
turned in the amount of $25,000 at the first trial, and 
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that the Supreme Court order judgment entered with 
interest thereon from the date of the verdict on the first 
trial. That interest should be allowed from date of verdict 
see, Hewitt vs. General Tire and Rubber Co., 5 U.2d 379, 
302 P.2d 712. It should be noted that defendant does not 
claim that any error was committed at the first trial. If 
such a claim is made, it has not been argued in defend-
ant's brief. We submit that there was no error and we 
submit in view of the verdict that has been returned by 
two separate juries in this matter and in view of the 
evidence adduced at both trials, that the trial court 
abused its discretion on the first trial in granting a new 
trial on grounds of excessive damages, and if the court 
should find there is reversible error on the second trial 
then we very sincerely urge the Supreme Court to rein-
state the verdict that was returned on the first trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff urges the Supreme Court to make the fol-
lowing alternative rulings: 
First: Hold that the cost of support of plaintiff's 
wife is not deductible at all and to reinstate all of the 
punitive dmnages that were awarded at the second trial 
and to order the entnT of judg1nent in favor of the plain-
tiff for the su1n of $39,500 with interest thereon from the 
date of the second verdict. 
Second: To affinn the judgment entered after the 
second trial. 
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Third : If, but only if, reversible error should be 
found to have been committed at the second trial, that 
the Supreme Court reinstate the verdict that was return-
ed at the first trial and order entry of judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff for the sum of $25,000 with interest there-
on from the date of the first verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HANNI, 
Attorneys for PlaintiJff 
and Respondent. 
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